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Fraud detection is vital in any financial transaction system, including the collection
of tax. The identification of fraud cases was traditionally carried out manually, having
fraud experts going through their records and intuitively selecting the ones to be audited
— a lengthy and unstructured process. Although work has been done with regards to the
use of artificial technology for fraud pattern discovery, the results are not encouraging
without major intervention by fraud experts [4].
Nowadays, in practice, patterns identified by fraud experts are coded by the soft-
ware developers who select fraud cases from a database. The resulting application is
verified by the fraud expert, who may feel the need to refine the rules in multiple it-
erations. However, this process is prone to human-induced bugs due to the continuous
manual work. A better approach would include the description of rules through the use
of a structured grammar, understandable by a computer system. With a compilable set
of descriptions, the rules may be automatically processed against historical data — lim-
iting the dependency on a software developer solely to the process of setting up the
system.
1 Proposed Solution
In order to enable an automated system, the fraud patterns need to be translatable to a
more computerised language. Fully natural languages tend to lead towards ambiguous
descriptions [1]. Domain Specific Languages (DSL) [2] are languages whose expres-
sivity is focused on the domain in question. The control of expressiveness is derived
from the implementation of core concepts with further functionalities built on top of
these [3]. For instance, in a tax-related fraud detection system, a rule: “Any company
declaring less than 2000 Euro in profits is fraudulent", may need to be described. With
a DSL, the core definitions (i) company, (ii) year, and (iii) profits would be defined first.
These would subsequently be used to build rules, similar to Figure 1c. Being built on
a grammar (with defined functions), a well-designed DSL reduces the ambiguity of the
rules defined. For instance, the natural example does not specify the year in question,
whilst in a DSL, the year may be compulsory for the definition.
DSLs like [3] however expose a syntax that is unnatural for fraud experts, since it
is built on top of a programming language. Controlled Natural Languages (CNL)[5]
are a type of DSL legible to human beings whilst still being easily processed by a
computerised system. One of the major tools in this area is Grammatical Framework
(GF) [1], which enables the definition of multiple grammars, linked through a common
structure. Defining the grammars from scratch allows us to control the expressivity in
the fraud detection language. We propose to translate an English-like sentence (Figure
1a) to a programming-like representation (Figure 1c), the former targeting the fraud
detection patterns, whilst the latter would be used for the detection of cases. Figure
1b represents the intermediate representation between the translation. An English-like
language is more natural for a fraud expert, due to the morphological inflictions done
with GF. For instance, “Any company" in Figure 1a would imply a singular noun, which
is subsequently reflected in the “is fraudulent" part. Once the programming code is
created, an automated system can select the matching cases from a historical data and
return them to the fraud expert, as shown in Figure 1d. This feedback mechanism allows
for rules to be defined in an iterative style, such as refining the “2000 Euro" to another
value to view the difference in the selected cases.
(a) Any company declaring less than 2000 Euro
in profits for the current year is fraudulent
(b) Declare(Company, Profit, less, 2000, CurrentYear)
(c) Company.Year(Current).Profit <  2000
(d) Company Profits
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Fig. 1. Automated process: (a) definitions with a CNL , (b) interpreted to an abstract language,
(c) translated to Java-like syntax, and (d) feedback returned to the fraud expert.
2 Conclusions
In this work we have proposed a way to allow fraud experts to define fraud patterns in a
natural way while reducing possible ambiguities. This work will involve the creation of
grammars, and the resulting language will be evaluated by an auditor from the Inland
Revenue Department. The translated rules will then be processed, and with certain pre-
processing, matched cases will be returned to the expert in a timely manner.
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